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Abstract 
Advocates of the New Mechanicism in philosophy of science argue that 
scientific explanation often consists in describing mechanisms responsible 
for natural phenomena.  Despite its successes, one might think that this 
approach does not square with the ontological strictures of quantum 
mechanics.  New Mechanists suppose that mechanisms are composed of 
objects with definite properties, which are interconnected via local causal 
interactions. Quantum mechanics calls these suppositions into question. 
Since mechanisms are hierarchical it appears that even macroscopic 
mechanisms   must   supervene   on   a   set   of   “objects”   that   behave   non-
classically. In this paper we argue, in part by appeal to the theory of 
quantum decoherence, that the universal validity of quantum mechanics 
does not undermine neo-mechanistic ontological and explanatory claims as 
they occur within in classical domains.  Additionally, we argue that by 
relaxation of certain classical assumptions, mechanistic explanatory 
strategies can sometimes be carried over into the quantum domain. 
In the last fifteen years there has been a good deal of attention focused on the idea of 
mechanism as a central organizing principle for understanding both ontological and 
explanatory questions in the sciences. A group of philosophers of science often called 
the New Mechanists have argued that most of the phenomena that scientists seek to 
explain are the product of the operation of mechanisms, where mechanisms are 
understood as collections of objects (the parts of the mechanism) that are organized in 
such a way as to be productive of the phenomena in question. 
Our goal in this paper is to explore how well this neo-mechanistic worldview 
coheres with the picture of nature that we derive from quantum mechanics. There is 
prima facie reason to be concerned that the two pictures do not fit well together. The 
neo-mechanists suppose that mechanisms are composed of objects with definite 
properties, where these objects are connected to each other via local causal interactions. 
Quantum mechanics (QM) calls into question whether there are really such things as 
objects with definite properties and whether causal relations can be understood in terms 
of local interactions between such objects.  Moreover, mechanisms are hierarchical in 
the sense that the parts of mechanisms may themselves be complex objects composed of 
subparts which are components of lower level mechanisms. It seems then that even 
complex  macroscopic  mechanisms  must   supervene   on   a   set   of   “objects”   that   behave  
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non-classically.  This dependence upon a non-classical micro-level might seem to infect 
the ontological and even explanatory claims of the New Mechanists. 
Our judgment is that a more careful description of the relationship between 
mechanisms and quantum mechanical phenomena will show that these concerns are ill 
founded.  Despite real differences between quantum mechanical and classical 
ontologies, we shall argue that the phenomenon of quantum decoherence accounts for 
the emergence of classical objects and properties, and that these objects and properties 
provide an appropriate ontological grounding for mechanistic explanation.1 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the differences between quantum mechanical and 
classical ontologies, there are important analogies between some quantum mechanical 
explanations and classical mechanistic explanations that allow us to legitimately speak 
of quantum-mechanical mechanisms.2 
Our paper will proceed as follows: We begin in part I with a characterization of the 
ontological claims of the New Mechanists. In part II, we summarize important non-
classical features of QM and discuss how these are plausibly interpreted as posing a 
threat to the New Mechanist agenda. In part III, we examine the theory of quantum 
decoherence, a kind of analysis of quantum mechanical systems which provides insight 
into why many macroscopic systems behave classically. In part IV, we discuss how 
decoherence can be appealed to defuse the worries in part II – thus providing 
ontological and explanatory legitimacy to mechanistic explanations of classically 
behaving systems. Finally, in part V, we consider how to apply mechanistic strategies to 
the explanation of systems that do not behave classically.  
1 The Ontological Claims of the New Mechanists 
Beginning in the 1990s, and especially since the publication of the widely cited paper 
“Thinking   about  Mechanisms” (Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000), philosophers of 
science have paid an increasing amount of attention to the concept of mechanism and its 
role in scientific inquiry. The New Mechanists have argued that many scientists across a 
range of disciplines understand their work as involving the discovery and description of 
mechanisms responsible for the production of the phenomena that they study. It is often 
pointed out that an account of scientific activity that gives centrality to the concept of 
mechanism is more descriptively adequate in most sciences than one that focuses on 
scientific laws; accordingly, the New Mechanists argue that activities such as model and 
theory construction, testing, explanation and prediction must be recast in a mechanistic 
light. 
It is a challenge to clearly identify the ontological claims of the New Mechanists.  There 
are terminological and sometimes substantive disagreements among the New 
Mechanists, and their ontological positions have shifted somewhat since their first 
publications (Bechtel & Richardson 1993, Glennan 1996, Machamer et al 2000).  A 
                                                 
1 While our discussion of the philosophical implications of decoherence theory focuses on the New 
Mechanists, much of what we say may be relevant to a broader class of views that hold that macroscopic 
objects are ontologically legitimate and explanatorily central. 
2 The central argument of this paper does not depend upon the technical details of quantum 
mechanics and decoherence, so our aim in this paper will be to present the argument in a non-technical 
form, comprehensible to the non-specialist.  For more precise formulations of decoherence, see 
Schlosshauer 2007 and Joos et al. 2003. 
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detailed discussion of these disagreements and shifts is beyond the scope of this paper.  
We will limit ourselves to a description of the points about which the New Mechanists 
(as expressed in their recent work) appear to be in agreement, together our own 
elaboration of what we take to be the most plausible ontological picture that is 
consistent with this consensus position. 
 One of the tasks that have occupied the New Mechanists is to give a concise but 
informative characterization of what a mechanism is (see, e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
2005; Glennan 1996, 2002; Machamer, Darden & Craver 2000). One way to summarize 
the mechanistic consensus is this: Mechanisms consist of parts (entities, components) 
that are so organized that the activities and interactions of these entities are productive 
of a phenomenon. 
 There are several features of the consensus that are relevant to understanding the 
ontological presuppositions of the New Mechanists.  First, mechanisms consist of 
discrete parts. As Glennan (2008, 378) writes,  “By  calling  parts   ‘entities’ or ‘objects,’ 
mechanists suggest that parts have properties that are relatively stable over time and that 
at least theoretically these parts are subject to manipulation and isolation from the rest 
of   the  mechanism.” While parts are taken to be real things as opposed to explanatory 
constructs, the New Mechanists agree that there is an inherent perspectivalism in the 
process of identifying and individuating parts: mechanisms are always mechanisms for 
some phenomenon or behaviour (Glennan 1996, Darden 2008, Craver 2013).  A single 
system that exhibits a variety of behaviors may be decomposed in different ways 
depending upon what mechanism-dependent phenomena one begins with.  For instance, 
if the phenomenon in question is range of motion of primate limbs, parts would include 
such things as bones, muscles and ligaments.  If on the other hand, the phenomenon in 
question concerns coordination and control of limbs, there would be a different division 
– including, for instance, sensory and motor neurons, parts whose boundaries cross-cut 
the boundaries of the parts upon which range-of-motion phenomena depend.  This is in 
part an explanatory point, but the New Mechanists accept a broadly realist account of 
explanation in which these decompositions are explanatory because they refer to real 
features of the world. 
A second feature of the New Mechanist consensus is the idea that phenomena 
exhibited by the mechanisms are produced by the activities and interactions of parts. 
The   terms   ‘activity’,   ‘interaction’, and   ‘produce’   are   all   transparently causal. If the 
activities and interactions are not genuinely causal, then mechanism   can’t   produce  
anything. Mechanistic explanation is a species of causal explanation and the legitimacy 
of mechanistic explanation depends upon the interactions between parts being genuinely 
causal.  
It appears at first glance that there are serious substantive disagreements among the 
mechanists about just what activities and interactions are.  Much of this appearance is 
due to the Machamer et al 2000, which frames its characterization of mechanisms in 
opposition to the earlier views of Glennan (1996).  Machamer, Darden and Craver 
characterized  their  ontological  position  as  “dualist”  as  opposed  to the views of Glennan 
and Bechtel and Richardson, which they describe   as   “substantivalist.”     Their view is 
supposedly dualist because they say that mechanisms consist of entities and activities, 
and that neither category is reducible to the other. 
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Although Machamer et al 2000 makes a number of important points about the 
ontology   of   mechanisms,   we   believe   the   term   ‘dualism’   is   misleading.  It overstates 
ontological disagreements with Glennan and Bechtel and suggests an unnecessarily 
spooky view of activities that is not developed in subsequent work.  The sense in which 
their position is dualistic is simply in insisting that any proper characterization of a 
mechanism will make reference not just to the parts of that mechanism, but also to the 
activities (and interactions) of those parts.  But this is something that Glennan and 
Bechtel certainly agree with.  Moreover, the term ‘dualism’ suggests an independence 
of entities and activities that is implausible.  Activities always require actors, and there 
are no entities which   don’t   (or   at   least   can’t)   engage   in   activities.  Perhaps the most 
obvious  difference  between   the   terms   ‘activity’   and   ‘interaction’ concerns the arity of 
the relation (Illari & Williamson 2012).  An interaction always involves more than one 
entity or part,   while   the   term   ‘activity’   is   inclusive   of   both   interactions   and   solo  
activities.3 
The New Mechanists embrace an approach to causality that falls within the family 
of   approaches   that   Woodward   (2011)   has   characterized   as   “geometrical-mechanical”  
accounts.  These accounts, which also include the causal-mechanical approach to causal 
processes that has been advocated by Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe, suggest that 
genuine causality is an intrinsic relation that depends upon singular connections via 
continuous processes.  They are contrasted with what Woodward (and many others) call 
difference-making accounts, which understand causality as an extrinsic and comparative 
relation in which counterfactual dependence (or perhaps other sorts of comparative 
relations) rather than productive connection is essential.4  The New Mechanist approach 
diverges from the Salmon/Dowe approach to productivity in its causal pluralism.  
Rather than seeking a reductive analysis in terms of some physical characteristic (like 
exchange of conserved quantities) the New Mechanists argue that there are many sorts 
of causes, corresponding to different sorts of activities and interactions, which produce 
different kinds of changes in different kinds of entities.  For instance kinds of activities 
and interactions that occur in ecological systems (e.g., trophic interactions between 
plants and animals like predation and grazing) are very different than those that occur in 
biochemical systems (e.g., unwinding and transcription of DNA or folding of proteins).   
   A third feature of the New Mechanist consensus is its focus on organization.  It 
is the organization of the entities (and their activities) that allows the mechanism to 
produce the phenomenon that it does.  A pile of lawnmower parts does not a 
lawnmower make. While mechanists emphasize the importance of spatial and temporal 
organization, it is ultimately the causal organization upon which the productive 
capacities of the mechanism depend.  
                                                 
3 We concur with Tabery (2004) that all mechanisms require that at least some of their activities be 
interactive.  See  Machamer (2004), Darden (2008), and Glennan (2010) for further discussion of this 
point. 
4 A notable exception here appears to be Craver (2007).  Principally because of concerns about 
causal relevance the problem of causation by disconnection, Craver retreated from the MDC approach to 
activities and adopted significant parts of Woodward’s  difference  making  approach  to  causality.    While  it  
is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  paper  to  argue  for  it,  our  view  is  that  Craver’s  retreat  does  not  sit  well  with  
other of his commitments – most notably to a picture of etiological causal explanations that looks very 
much  like  Salmon’s. 
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To clarify the role or organization in mechanisms, consider as a brief example the 
mechanism for starting a lawnmower engine. The engine is started by rapidly pulling a 
cord while the throttle is set to an appropriate level. The cord is attached to a flywheel 
which in turn engages a clutch which causes the crank shaft to move, which in turn 
moves the piston, allowing air and fuel into the cylinder. The flywheel is also connected 
to a magneto – a device which uses the rotation of magnets to generate a voltage. The 
magneto is attached to the sparkplug which produces the spark that ignites the fuel-air 
mixture in the piston.  The production of the phenomenon (namely the starting of the 
mower) depends essentially on organization. The parts must be spatially organized so 
that the same part – the flywheel – may simultaneously engage the clutch and turn the 
magneto. Timing is also essential here. The parts must be so organized that the spark 
generated by the spark plug  enters  the  cylinder  at  the  correct  time  in  the  piston’s  cycle. 
These spatial and temporal arrangements determine the causal organization of the 
system.   
An important consequence of the New Mechanist view of causal organization is a 
certain kind of anti-holism.  Typically it is not the case that every part of a mechanism is 
causally connected to every other part.  And in many cases of causal dependence, the 
connecting process will be indirect. For instance, in the lawn mower, the pulling the 
cord may produce a movement of the piston – but not directly.  It operates via a chain of 
more direct interactions of the intervening parts.  
A fourth feature of the New Mechanist approach is its focus on the hierarchical 
organization of mechanisms.  Mechanisms and the phenomena they produce may in turn 
be embedded in larger mechanisms, and the parts of mechanisms and their activities and 
interactions may be explained in terms of the operations of lower-level mechanisms. 
This idea is schematically represented in diagrams such as the one found in figure 1 
(redrawn from Glennan 2011).   
 
 
 
 
Glennan emphasizes that the activities and interactions of the parts of mechanisms are 
“mechanically  explicable”  – meaning that what is, at one level of the hierarchy, a direct 
interaction between parts, will be explained as the operation of a complex mechanism at 
     a      b 
    a1 
     a2 
     a3 
    b1 
     b2     i1      i2 
Figure 1: Hierarchical Arrangement of Mechanisms 
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a lower level. In this diagram, the upper level circles and arrows represent higher-level 
entities and interactions, while the lower level circles represent lower level ones.5   
An obvious question raised by this hierarchical organization, is if, when and how 
the hierarchy bottoms out.  Machamer et al (2000) emphasized that mechanistic 
explanations  start  from  “bottom-out”  entities  and  activities.     Machamer et al emphasize 
that   “bottoming   out   is   relative”   (ibid, 13). Within different fields or research groups, 
different activities will be taken as unproblematic and basic.   This is an important 
methodological observation, but it does not answer the metaphysical question of 
whether or not there are entities and activities that form an absolute bottom. 
Metaphysically we may identify a couple of possibilities.  One is a metaphysical 
atomism in which there is a set of basic objects – the atoms – that interact with each 
other, perhaps in a manner that is law-governed, but which is at any rate not explicable 
by further mechanisms. This position, often called microphysicalism (Pettit 1993), has 
its defenders in the metaphysics community, but we take it that our current best physics 
raises serious doubts about microphysicalism (Schaffer 2003; Ladyman and Ross 2007). 
Another possibility is that there are mechanisms all the way down; there is no 
fundamental level and every interaction is mechanically explicable.   
While we concur with Schaffer that there are not compelling scientific or 
metaphysical arguments for a fundamental level, the mechanisms-all-the-way-down 
approach does pose challenges for the ontological views of the New Mechanists.  The 
problem is not that the New Mechanists are committed to microphysicalism; it is rather 
that one cannot assume that all levels will have the ontological features required to 
provide mechanistic explanations of higher level entities and activities.  Even if there is 
no absolute bottom, there may be some level below which there are no classical 
mechanisms.  We will call this level the fundamental classical level.  
After a review of some important features of quantum mechanics, we will argue for 
two claims about the relationship between the New Mechanicism and the ontological 
consequences of quantum mechanics.  First, we shall show how the theory of quantum 
decoherence can explain the emergence of a fundamental classical level.  Second, we 
will show that, by relaxing certain assumptions, we can find within the quantum realm 
non-classical phenomena that can be explained mechanistically. 
                                                 
5 A referee has suggested that this hierarchical picture seems to commit the New Mechanists to a 
view that gives ontological priority to parts over wholes in the sense discussed by, e.g., Morganti (2009) 
and Schaffer (2010).  It is true that the New Mechanists hold that the causal powers (or activities) of 
wholes depend upon those of their parts, and this would seem to give ontological priority to their parts.  
But at the same time, as noted above, the  New  Mechanists’  are  committed  to  perspectivalism  about  part-
decomposition that is holistic: what the parts are cannot be answered independently of an account of what 
the mechanism as a whole is doing.  (This kind of holism is not inconsistent with the aforementioned anti-
holism according to which it is not the case that every part is connected to every other part.)  
We expect that the best way to cash out claims about the ontological priority of mechanisms versus their 
parts might be by looking at patterns of temporal order and causal dependence – and here the answers 
might not be univocal.  For instance, one might argue that the parts of the lawnmower are ontologically 
prior to the lawnmower as a whole, because the parts pre-exist the lawnmower.   Contrast this with the 
case of a living system (like a chipmunk) and its parts (like its muscles or veins).  In the latter case the 
parts do not pre-exist the whole, and they cannot survive and maintain their identity except in the context 
of the whole.   
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2 Potential Clashes between the New Mechanicism and Quantum 
Mechanics 
Let us draw together the key features of the mechanist consensus in order to 
identify the ontological suppositions of the New Mechanists and the potential conflicts 
that these ontological commitments have with ontological commitments that may be 
forced upon us by quantum mechanics:  
1. The New Mechanists believe that the world is composed of a variety of objects; 
many objects are compounded from smaller objects; there may or may not be 
some basic objects of which all other objects are made. Either way, in asserting 
that these objects (both the basic and the compound) are really objects, the New 
Mechanists suppose that these objects can be characterized by some set of 
properties that exist in the objects regardless of whether they are observed or 
measured.  
2. The New Mechanists believe that there are causal relations that obtain between 
these objects, basic or compound.  Higher level causal relations obtain in virtue 
of causal relations between parts of intervening mechanisms.  If there are any 
basic objects, there must be fundamental (non-mechanism-dependent) causal 
relations that obtain between them. 
3. The New Mechanists believe that causal interactions between the parts of a 
mechanism are intrinsic and local.  It is not the case that every part of the 
mechanism is connected to every other part.  Given a decomposition of 
mechanisms into parts, one can distinguish some causal influences that involve 
direct connection between parts, while other causal influences obtain via 
intermediate entities and activities. 
There are at least three non-classical features in quantum mechanics that seem to clash 
with the ontological commitments of the New Mechanists6:  
(A) Indeterminacy of properties 
(B) Non-localizability of quantum objects 
(C) Non-separability of quantum  states  due  to  entanglement  (“quantum  holism”) 
In this section we will explain briefly how these features of quantum mechanical 
systems arise, and where they appear to conflict with the ontological approach of the 
New Mechanists. 
From an ontological point of view the most initially disconcerting feature of 
quantum mechanics is arguably the (A) indeterminacy of properties. In general, QM 
only predicts probabilities for finding certain values of observable quantities upon 
measurement (e.g. position, momentum, spin). The issue is not that properties are fuzzy 
or unsharp. In the most extreme case, nothing at all can be said, i.e. there is not even an 
increased probability for finding a value in any given finite interval. A classic 
expression of this indeterminacy is Heisenberg’s   uncertainty   principle. According to 
this principle,  upon  precise  measurement  of,  say,  an  electron’s  position,   its momentum 
                                                 
6 The picture changes if one adopts one of the rival interpretations or revisions of quantum 
mechanics such as a many-worlds interpretation or the Bohmian approach. However, this would make the 
discussion far more complex and would distract from our main line of reasoning. 
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becomes completely uncertain,  and  conversely  a  precise  measurement  of  the  electron’s  
momentum makes the position uncertain. Thus  Heisenberg’s  uncertainty  principle tells 
us that it is impossible to simultaneously ascribe a sharp position and a sharp 
momentum to an electron, even though we can measure either its position or its 
momentum precisely, or both successively. More generally, it is impossible to 
simultaneously ascribe sharp values to all measurable properties of quantum objects.  
The apparent conflict between the mechanist program and the indeterminacy of 
properties arises from the fact that the phenomena produced by mechanisms are thought 
to be produced by the interaction of parts in virtue of their dynamically relevant 
properties.  If it is impossible to even ascribe these properties  to  the  mechanism’s  parts  
then the mechanistic program comes to a grinding halt in its very first step, namely the 
decomposition into interacting parts. 
Problem (B), the non-localizability of quantum objects, is in one sense just a 
particular instance of the indeterminacy of properties, in this case concerning the 
position observable. However, non-localizability has features that merit additional 
attention. If at a given time t0 the wave function of some quantum object is localized in 
a finite region it will develop, due to the dynamical law of quantum mechanics, infinite 
tails immediately after t0. In other words, the wave function will instantaneously spread 
over the entire space (Hegerfeldt 1998). This happens in non-relativistic quantum 
mechanics already but there it is not a problem because nothing forbids infinitely high 
velocities. At least it makes sense to assume that a quantum object is localized in a finite 
interval at some given time. However, if one respects the requirements of special 
relativity theory, localizability gets lost in a more drastic way: The very concept of a 
localized  object  doesn’t  fit  into  the  resulting theory any more.7  
Specifically concerning mechanisms, two problems arise. The first problem is that 
non-localizability implies that multiple quantum   objects   “occupy”   the   same   infinite  
space-time region. This obviously and unsurprisingly applies to light quanta. However, 
it also applies to quantum objects with (rest) mass, such as electrons. Thus apparently 
the most basic components are no longer spatiotemporally distinct objects as initially 
intended by the mechanistic program. Secondly, if quantum objects are spread out in the 
entire universe, then it  seems  that  they  don’t  qualify  as  those  entities  that  interact  locally 
in mechanisms. 
The third and final problem (C) concerns the non-separability of quantum states 
due to entanglement, also called quantum holism (Healey 2009). While the first two 
problems apply to single quantum objects already, non-separability applies only to 
composite systems.8 In general, quantum objects are entangled with each other. This 
means that complete possible knowledge about the states of the subsystems does not 
imply complete knowledge about the compound state. The reason for the entanglement 
of quantum objects are radically non-classical laws for their composition: The features 
of the composition are intrinsic properties of the compound system, which are not 
                                                 
7 See Halvorson and Clifton (2002) and Kuhlmann (2010:  sec. 8.3; 2012: sec. 5). 
8 In fact, (A) and (C), too, are intimately connected, because in order to spell out (A) one eventually 
has to deal with the compound state of some quantum object and a measurement apparatus, which 
become entangled through the measurement interaction. Nevertheless, metaphysically (A) and (C) focus 
on two distinct issues. Whereas (A) concerns the ascription of properties to single quantum objects, (C) 
focuses on the question how composite quantum systems relate to their parts. 
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captured by specifying all spatiotemporal properties of the separate subsystems. Thus 
non-separability – or quantum holism – may undermine the very conception of separate 
parts, which is indispensable for the mechanistic program. But there is also another 
point where quantum entanglement seems to clash with new mechanicism: Even the 
most complete information about the spatiotemporal organization of  the  system’s  parts  
does not determine the behavior of the whole system, thereby calling the key idea of 
mechanisms into question. 
Note that the issue of the non-determinateness of properties differs from non-
separability of states. In a sense, the latter is worse than the former. While the non-
determinateness of properties may be dealt with in terms of probabilistic dispositions or 
‘propensities’  (Suárez  2007), non-separability of states poses a still more serious threat 
to the applicability of the mechanistic conception in the quantum realm because it seems 
to prohibit the separate ascription of properties – be these determinate or only 
dispositional – to different parts of a compound system. Due  to  ‘quantum  holism’ one 
cannot say everything relevant about one given quantum object without having to say 
something about other quantum objects, too, and this applies not just to their mutual 
spatiotemporal relation. One may claim (Hüttemann 2005) that we are here dealing with 
a strong form of emergence because why a given compound system is in a certain 
superposition of entangled subsystems cannot be explained in terms of the states of its 
subsystems: The entangled parts of a compound system that is in a determinate state, 
namely a superposition, can no longer themselves be in determinate states (they are in 
so-called   “mixed   states”).9 Apparently this undermines the idea of explaining the 
behavior   of   a   system  mechanistically,   because   there   don’t   seem   to   be   any   separately 
describable parts below the level of the whole system.  
3  Decoherence and the Emergence of Classical Phenomena 
In the famous Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, commonly seen to be 
primarily built on the ideas of Niels Bohr10, there is a sharp divide between 
(microscopic) quantum objects and macroscopic measurement apparatuses: In order to 
describe the quantum world it is indispensable to refer to classical measurement 
apparatuses. Since measurement apparatuses thus differ fundamentally from quantum 
objects, it is impossible to understand what happens in a measurement. In loose 
connection with the Copenhagen interpretation it is then often said that measurement 
apparatuses can record determinate measurement outcomes because they are 
macroscopic. However, when we want to know a bit more about what is going on, this 
view turns out to be very unsatisfactory: First, where does the microscopic world end 
and our macroscopic world begin? In principle, quantum mechanics seems to be 
universally valid and govern our everyday world just as much as it governs the micro 
world. Second, if we make the natural assumption that macroscopic objects are 
themselves made up of microscopic quantum constituents, it is completely unclear why 
                                                 
9 As Hüttemann (2005) argues, “synchronic microexplanations”   fail   in   the   realm   of   quantum  
physics. Although  Hüttemann’s   focus   differs   from   that   of   the   present   investigation,   his   arguments   are  
nevertheless relevant with some suitable adjustments. 
10 See Scheibe (1973, ch. 1) for a very accurate   account   of   Bohr’s   ideas.There   is   considerable  
dispute  about  what  exactly  “the  Copenhagen interpretation”  is  and  how  it  relates  to  Bohr’s  views.  Howard  
(2002)   argues   that   “the  Copenhagen interpretation”  was   an   invention  by  Heisenberg   in   the  mid-1950s. 
Interestingly,   Howard   thinks   that   Bohr’s   complementarity interpretation is even close to decoherence 
theory (private communication). However, that is a very non-standard reading of Bohr. 
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there should be a fundamental physical divide between the quantum and the classical 
world in the first place. The postulate that measurement apparatuses must be described 
in a classical way even seems to forbid asking for the physical processes that take place 
when a quantum system interacts with a measurement apparatus to produce the 
determinate measurement outcomes we observe. 
Von Neumann (1932) broke sharply with this non-intelligibility dictum by offering 
a detailed account of the quantum measurement process. His account treats all relevant 
parts, including the measurement apparatus, as quantum systems. Virtually every 
modern treatment follows von Neumann’s account in many respects. However, while 
von  Neumann’s   descriptive   analysis,   terminology   and   general   approach   were   a   great  
break-through, in the end he primarily achieved a very lucid formulation of the basic 
problems, but not their solution. So it remained unclear whether it is appropriate to treat 
macroscopic objects as quantum systems, in particular given that they very often appear 
classical. 
In recent decades many experiments and industrial techniques have shown that 
quantum phenomena are not restricted to the microscopic level. And even in cosmology 
quantum physics is indispensable. Nevertheless, in our midsized everyday world and 
also in most scientific contexts, the peculiarities of quantum mechanics are surprisingly 
absent.11 These facts make it ever harder to explicate the quantum/classical boundary 
using a distinction between the microscopic and the macroscopic.  
The theory of decoherence provides a precise and explicit analysis of this 
boundary, following von Neumann in spirit. Its goal is to explain how classical behavior 
emerges in a world that is completely governed by the laws of quantum mechanics. In 
other words, decoherence attempts to explain why objects that are ultimately made up of 
quantum mechanical constituents very often behave classically. As we will see, 
decoherence shows which processes contribute to the suppression of quantum effects in 
macroscopic systems. However, in all of the following one has to be aware that 
decoherence only supplies partial and approximate answers. They are partial because 
they have to be combined with further considerations or particular interpretations of 
quantum mechanics. And the answers of decoherence are approximate in the sense that 
quantum effects never disappear completely.  
3.1 Non-Classical Phenomena 
In section 2, we introduced those non-classical features of quantum phenomena that 
appear to pose problems for the New Mechanist.  To explain how decoherence theory 
might explain away these problems, it will be helpful to focus on a famous QM 
experiment that manifests these phenomena – the double-slit experiment. 
Since the fundamental dynamical law of QM, the Schrödinger equation, is linear, 
the sum of any two solutions is also a solution and thus represents a possible state of 
affairs. The superposition principle in itself is well-known from classical physics: 
water, sound or electromagnetic waves are also described by linear wave equations, and 
can therefore be added together, sometimes producing interference effects. In the 
double-slit experiment, we appear to observe the same phenomenon.  Light passing 
through two parallel slits projects onto a screen, and we see an interference pattern that 
                                                 
11 Since there is no need to distinguish (non-relativistic) quantum mechanics, (relativistic) quantum 
field theory and other parts of quantum physics, we will often use the most well-known  term  ‘quantum  
mechanics’  in  a  comprehensive  way,  as  it  is  quite  common  among  physicists,  too. 
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seems to arise from the classical superposition of two waves, one originating from the 
upper slit and one from the lower slit.  
On closer scrutiny something odd happens, which is most clearly apparent when 
we perform the double-slit experiment with an electron beam. It is possible to lower the 
rate of electrons in the beam so much that only one electron at a time passes through the 
double-slit.12 We know this, because we detect dot-like hits of single electrons on the 
screen. At first these dots seem to be random but after a while we see a pattern forming, 
namely the same kind of interference pattern of multiple bright and dark bands that we 
get for classical waves passing through a double-slit – the notorious wave-particle 
duality. 
How do these individual electrons collectively form the interference pattern? One 
could imagine that it is different electrons, some passing through the upper and some 
passing through the lower slit, whose effects are superposed and lead to the interference. 
However, this cannot be the case because we know that we get the interference pattern 
even if we make sure that only one electron passes through the double-slit at a time. 
Hence the superposition of whatever goes through the upper and the lower slit must 
refer to a single electron already. Thus after an electron has passed through the double-
slit we have a so-called  “coherent  superposition”  of  two  states that classically exclude 
each other, namely first, for the electron having gone through the upper slit and, second, 
for it having gone through the lower slit (Schlosshauer 2007, sec. 2.2.)  
The peculiarities of wave-particle duality might be tolerated for small quantum 
objects like electrons, but the same effects can occur on larger scales.  Wave-particle 
duality has been experimentally demonstrated in the behavior of buckyballs—large, 
cage-like carbon C60 molecules  (see figure 2). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It seems that something as large as a C60 molecule must be well localized in any 
context. And in fact, it is hard to realize experimental arrangements in which we see 
wave-like effects for large objects. But it is possible, and nothing prevents interference 
effects from occurring not only with electrons and buckyballs, but also with 
                                                 
12 See Tonomura et al.  1989. 
Figure 2: Interference pattern produced by Buckyball molecules (Adapted from Nairz et al. 2003. Need to 
ask for permission from American Journal of Physics!)  
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macroscopic objects. The superposition principle of quantum mechanics allows for 
highly non-classical states on any scale (e.g.  for  Schrödinger’s  cat).  
Mathematically speaking, the quantum mechanical superposition principle says that 
any linear combination of states, i.e. essentially any sum of states, is also a state. 
Ontologically  speaking,  this  means  that  a  superposition  is  on  a  par  with  its  “component  
states”13 (the summands in the linear combination), i.e. the superposed states. 
Superpositions are strikingly non-classical because mutually exclusive classical states 
are ascribed to one  and  the  same  “object”, and interfere with each other as if there were 
different interacting objects. Saying that a superposition is coherent then means that the 
component states, which are added up, all refer to one object and not to an ensemble of 
objects.  
The presence of superpositions is at the core of the most severe conceptual problem 
of quantum mechanics, the quantum measurement problem: On the one hand, quantum 
mechanics tells us that a superposition can arise when a quantum object interacts with a 
measurement apparatus and remains a superposition for all times—according to the one 
and only dynamical law of quantum mechanics, the Schrödinger equation. On the other 
hand, the measurement results we actually find, particular pointer positions, and which 
quantum mechanics predicts to occur with certain probabilities, are determinate 
outcomes. This is a formidable conflict because the Schrödinger equation never brings 
us from superpositions to determinate measurement outcomes. There appears to be an 
acute need for such a second kind of dynamics, the so-called collapse of the wave 
function. 
In order to appreciate the paramount significance of the measurement problem, it is 
important to realize that this is not a problem concerning measurements per se. It is 
about the ubiquitous manifestation of determinate properties, which the basic dynamical 
law  of  quantum  mechanics,  the  Schrödinger  equation,  doesn’t  seem  to  allow.  While the 
problem can be described in terms of laboratory measurements, wave collapse (via 
“quantum  measurements”)  happens everywhere and all the time. Only a tiny fraction of 
these events take place in a lab. According to the Schrödinger equation, any object – be 
it microscopic or macroscopic – that interacts in a suitable way with a quantum object in 
some superposition should itself be in a non-classical superposition for all future times. 
However, this is not what we observe. 
3.2 Decoherence as an Explanation of the Emergence of Classical Phenomena 
The fact that superpositions and the resulting interference effects are so hard to realize 
and detect even for objects the size of C60 molecules, which are still much smaller than, 
say, cats, indicates that something seems to be going on that is ever more difficult to 
avert as objects get larger. This something is called decoherence.14 It is almost 
ubiquitous in macro-realms because the larger an object is the more it tends to interact 
with its environment. When it does, it gets entangled with so many other close and 
remote things that there is no longer any way to locally detect a quantum superposition 
                                                 
13 Note that this common talk is somewhat misleading because superpositions do not actually 
consist of  the  superposed  states.  Any  basis  change  leads  to  a  different  set  of  “component  states”. 
14 See Bacciagaluppi 2012, Joos et al. 2003, Schlosshauer 2007, Zurek 1981, 1982, 1991, 2002 und 
2003 und Wallace forthcoming. 
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and the resulting interference effects. The crucial point is that the superposition gets 
delocalized into the environment so that the coherence of the superposition decreases 
and eventually almost disappears.15 Accordingly, the characteristic quantum mechanical 
interference effects are suppressed due to interactions between the respective system 
and its macroscopic environment. Thus coherence is  a  measure  of  the  “quantumness”  of  
a physical system and decoherence is the process by which this quantumness effectively 
disappears. 
Let us describe more closely the phenomenon of decoherence. If electrons 
travelling through the double slit were classical objects, then they would produce two 
peaks on the screen behind the slits; but they instead produce the non-classical 
interference pattern. Moreover, this pattern cannot be explained as representing our 
ignorance about the electron trajectories, since the classical alternatives (going through 
one or the other slit) interfere with each other for one and the same object. As we have 
seen in section 3.1, such a non-classical superposition of classical alternatives can be 
amplified up to any scale.  
It is helpful to describe a superposition mathematically in terms of a so-called 
density matrix. Figure 3 contains a graphical representation of the density matrix for a 
“Schrödinger cat state”   (Zurek   2002),   i.e.   a   non-classical superposition of classical 
alternatives. The two peaks on the left and right side graphically represent the off-
diagonal elements of the density matrix, which are responsible for the non-classical 
interference effects. Usually we don’t  observe  any such effects on macroscopic scales. 
But why is that so? The standard formalism of quantum mechanics seems to give us no 
reason to expect that the off-diagonal elements, and thereby the non-classical 
interference effects, should disappear on any scale. In particular, it seems that 
measurement devices should inherit the interference behavior from the quantum objects 
they are designed to measure. Quantum mechanics tells us that they become entangled 
with the quantum objects to be measured and just form bigger superpositions, so that we 
get the same problem again on a higher scale. 
Decoherence   theory   provides   a   plausible   explanation   of   why   we   don’t   see   such  
superpositions. In essence, decoherence theory suggests that in most situations, quantum 
entanglement is spread into the environment, making non-classical superpositions 
locally unobservable. Formally, the idea is to extend the so-called von Neumann chain 
S + A of system S and measurement apparatus A to include environment E, so that we 
get the bigger system S + A + E, and to then abstract from the environment again.16 This 
is no formal trick. Rather, the point is that our puzzlement over the rarity of 
macroscopically entangled states arises from an insufficient application of the quantum 
formalism. The extension of the von Neumann chain is motivated by the realization that 
the system S + A, like most physical systems in nature, is hardly ever isolated, but an 
open system, which interacts more or less intensely with its environment E. 
                                                 
15 In the course of a decoherence process quantum states effectively lose their (quantum) coherence. 
The coherence that is removed by decoherence is the one present in coherent superpositions, where the 
adjective ‘coherent’   is   usually  dropped  and  one   simply   talks  about   ‘superpositions’.  Note   that   the   term  
‘decoherence’   was   introduced   only   in   the   late   1980s.   This   now   well-established term may be a bit 
unfortunate because coherence sounds like a desirable property, which classical objects in particular do 
have.  Also   note   that   the   term   ‘decoherence’  may   refer   either   to   the  process  of   decoherence   and  or   the  
theory of decoherence.  
16 Schlosshauer 2007, ch. 1 and sec. 9.2, has a concise non-technical discussion of this procedure. 
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The second step, abstracting from the environment again, is again a formal step 
with a solid physical interpretation.17 Here, too, the crucial point consists in appreciating 
the consequences of an obvious fact: what we actually deal with, as scientists as well as 
in our everyday lives, is not the universe as a whole with all of the interconnections of 
its constituents; what we actually deal with is a small number of features of local states 
of affairs. Thus, although in principle quantum systems interact with the whole universe 
and build up infinitely many entanglements, what we observe and measure is only a tiny 
fraction of this system. Nonetheless, it is due to this interaction that the interference/ 
entanglement/ coherence present in a local system S + A gets irreversibly delocalized 
into the environment E. The Schrödinger dynamics, according to which a superposition 
always stays a superposition, thus appears to be broken – provided we restrict our 
perspective to S + A. The system S + A appears disentangled although, and in fact 
because, it is entangled with its entire environment. Thus this second step consists in 
deliberately dispensing with information that is effectively no longer available to us.18 
Ideally, the establishment of an entanglement with the environment has the effect that 
the density matrix of S + A has no off-diagonal terms, which represent the troublesome 
interference between classical alternatives.19 In   practice   the   interference   terms   don’t  
vanish completely but just become very small (see figure 3). The degree to which the 
interference terms disappear is a measure for how well the system “decoheres”.20 
 
  
                                                 
17 Note that the “environment”  is  not  necessarily  something  outside  of  the  measurement  apparatus.  
“Environment”   can   also   refer   to   macroscopic   internal   degrees   of   freedom   besides   those   which   are  
explicitly responsible for the measurement. 
18 Technically speaking, the interaction with the environment has the effect that S + A is no longer 
in a (pure) state, whereas the superposition, in which S + A + E is, is a pure state. If we are interested in 
S + A alone, we need to calculate the so-called  “reduced  state”  of S + A by removing all the information 
that refers to the environment. The reduced state of S + A encodes only the local measurement statistics 
for S + A, and no measurement statistics referring to correlations between S + A and the environment E. 
19 But note that even if the off-diagonal terms vanish completely, an ignorance interpretation is not 
allowed, since this would presuppose a classical ensemble of alternatives. 
20 This is in turn determined by how effectively the environment can unambiguously detect the state 
of the system. One point is that the environment must have at least as many different states as the system 
under observation; another one is that these environment states must have little, or ideally: no, overlap. 
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4 Decoherence and the Grounding of the New Mechanicism 
In section 2 of this paper we identified three apparent threats posed by the non-classical 
features of quantum mechanics, namely (A) indeterminacy of properties, (B) non-
localizability of quantum objects, and (C) non-separability of quantum states due to 
entanglement. In this section, we will show how, in light of our discussion of 
decoherence and of the local character of mechanistic explanation, these features do not 
in fact threaten the mechanistic program in the ways we might have supposed. 
Threat (A) says that since quantum objects – and thereby all objects – fail to 
possess definite values for dynamically relevant properties (in particular position and 
momentum), mechanistic decomposition into locally interacting parts is not possible. As 
we saw in the last section the basic reason for this quantum mechanical indeterminacy 
of properties is that, with respect to most observables, quantum objects are in 
superpositions of different values and these superpositions never disappear through any 
interaction that is described by the Schrödinger equation. But we also learnt that due to 
decoherence these superpositions are effectively invisible for most real systems that 
interact with their environment. Thus decoherence shows that threat (A) is much less 
acute in most cases where we want to give mechanistic explanations. 
In one sense, as we noted in section 2, non-localizability (B) is just the problem of 
the indeterminacy (A) of one particularly important property, spatial position.  
However, given the special importance of position in many mechanistic explanations, 
and in particular the inconsistency between the quantum-mechanical indeterminacy of 
position and the special relativistic requirement of causality, more needs to be said 
about (B). Fortunately, it turns out that beyond the general reasons regarding 
indeterminacy of properties, the theory of decoherence indicates that there are special 
reasons that explain why position behaves more classically than other observables. The 
problem we don’t have with the position observable is most intuitively visible when we 
formulate it regarding the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics: In its 
strongest version it says that for each measurement-like interaction we have a branching 
Figure 3: Evolution of the density matrix for the Schrödinger cat state (Reprinted from Zurek 2002). The 
smaller the melted peaks on the right side are (representing the off-diagonal elements), the 
better the system decoheres. 
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into a multitude of coexisting worlds—thus   no   “collapse   of   the   wave   function”. 
However, the formalism of QM allows decomposing a given quantum state in many 
different  incompatible  ways.  So  the  standard  quantum  measurement  theory  doesn’t  tell  
us with respect to which observable the branching into parallel worlds occurs—a 
formidable problem. Decoherence yields the solution: it is not the case that all 
observables are on a par. The interaction with the environment is often such that one 
observable is effectively selected.21 In most cases the so-called  “preferred  pointer  basis”  
happens to be the one of the position observable. There is no general law why it should 
be  that  way,  but  that’s  the  result  of  many  concrete  calculations  for  particular  examples  
of decoherence processes. That the preferred pointer basis refers to position means that 
it is this property in particular that behaves classically—again only from a local 
perspective of course. This means that locally macroscopic objects are typically not in 
superpositions of different positions. 
Finally, decoherence also substantially attenuates threat (C)—the non-separability 
of quantum states due to entanglement. In principle entanglement is omnipresent, and it 
can in fact be detected even in large macroscopic objects such as the particle accelerator 
in CERN, which has a circumference of almost 27 kilometers. However, because of 
environment-induced decoherence, quantum entanglement is hardly ever visible on such 
macroscopic scales. One can only sustain detectable large-scale quantum entanglements 
if one has a system as   super   “clean”  and   shielded   from environmental interactions as 
one finds in a particle accelerator in a tunnel 175 meters beneath the ground. Thus, 
because of decoherence, quantum entanglement usually plays no role on scales where 
mechanistic explanations start. 
In our exposition of the decoherence program, we have emphasized that the theory 
of decoherence explains why the world we observe appears to be approximately 
classical in local contexts and at macroscopic scales.  We should couple this observation 
with an explicit reminder that decoherence theory does not (by itself at least) solve the 
measurement problem or other conceptual problems in quantum mechanics.22  But these 
are not the problems we seek to solve.  For our purposes, the main significance of 
decoherence lies not in its contribution to the foundations of quantum mechanics, but in 
the explanation it gives of why and to what extent it is legitimate to treat the many 
things in the world around us in a classical way. 
The value of the decoherence program depends upon whether one is concerned 
with local or global questions. While decoherence alone is insufficient for global 
interpretive matters, it is very helpful for questions viewed from a local perspective. By 
a local perspective, we mean any physical situation where a given system can be 
distinguished from its larger environment. A local perspective can be taken towards 
systems of any size.23 We can ask local questions even about very large systems like 
galaxies, since these can still be distinguished from their global environment within the 
universe.  In contexts that are local in this sense, decoherence helps to explain why 
                                                 
21 Mathematically, this is represented by the suppression of off-diagonal elements in the reduced 
density matrix of S + A. 
22 Ultimately we need something more, either a particular interpretation or possibly a combination 
of decoherence with a different approach (see Landsman 2007). 
23 Note that this notion of locality differs from the one familiar in the philosophy of quantum 
mechanics, which refers to the causal separation of space-like related events. 
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systems whose constituents are ultimately subject to the laws of quantum mechanics 
behave approximately classically. This legitimates classical mechanistic explanations of 
the behavior of such systems. Moreover, it does so in a way that is largely independent 
of any particular interpretation of quantum mechanics.24 
One way of understanding what is required for the mechanistic approach is to 
say that there must be some fundamental classical level, a bottom-out level of 
classically behaving entities that can be used to ground mechanistic explanations of 
higher-level phenomena. The decoherence account provides us with an account of how 
this fundamental classical level emerges, but an important consequence of this account 
is that it shows that and why this level is not a uniform one. The fundamental classical 
level is not absolute but depends on the specific circumstances. We can have quasi-
classical objects on the level of molecules, as in nano-technology, and we can also have 
detectable quantum phenomena on macroscopic scales (e.g., superconductivity, laser 
light, EPR correlations over large distances at CERN).   What decoherence tells us is 
that it is not size per se that matters for the emergence of apparent classicality, but the 
kinds and quantities of interactions between a system and its environment.  
The non-uniformity of the classical boundary fits well with the ontological 
presuppositions of the neo-mechanistic approach.  The mechanistic approach starts from 
the assumption that mechanisms are local (Glennan 2011; McKay Illari and Williamson 
2011), which is to say that the causal powers and behaviors of mechanisms arise from 
the arrangement and interactions of particular parts situated at a particular location in 
space and time.  There is no need to appeal to some single set of universally valid laws 
to account for these interactions.  The mechanistic approach, like the decoherence 
approach, shows how to explain the behavior of particular systems located within 
particular environments. 
5   Non-Classical Mechanisms within Quantum Mechanics 
Our strategy in this paper has, to this point, been largely defensive. We have argued that 
decoherence provides a useful explanation of why, in particular local circumstances, 
systems behave classically in spite of their being ultimately constituted of entities that 
obey the principles of quantum mechanics, and that this explanation deflects possible 
concerns over the ontological and explanatory legitimacy of the mechanistic approach. 
However, it is not the case that all systems behave classically, and in particular 
there are some systems whose macroscopic-scale behavior depends essentially on non-
classical features of the parts that constitute them. Familiar examples are 
superconductors25 and lasers, but nanotechnological26 and even some biological systems 
                                                 
24 Moreover, in most, if not all, of the extant proposals for an interpretation (or modification) of 
quantum mechanics, classical mechanics and quantum mechanics are at least less in conflict from the 
very start. For instance, in the many worlds interpretation within each of the many worlds all objects have 
definite properties. And in Bohmian quantum mechanics, the position is classical, and thus localized, 
from  the  very  start;;  it  is  only  unobservable  (a  “hidden  variable”).  However,  like  quantum  mechanics,  yet  
in  a  more  drastic  way,  Bohmian  mechanics  is  a  “non-local”  theory,  e.g.  even  space-like separated objects 
can influence each other.  
25 See Hartmann (2008) for a philosophical discussion. 
26 See Band and Avishai (2013, sec. 1.2, ch. 11, 13, 15). 
18 
 
belong in this group.27 Are such systems mechanistically explicable? – Yes and no. It is 
clear that traditional mechanistic explanation depends upon assumptions that the parts 
and interactions involved in the production of phenomena are classical – and so 
classical mechanistic strategies cannot be used to explain such phenomena. On the other 
hand, we think that there are important similarities between classical mechanistic 
explanations and certain varieties of explanations for the behavior of genuinely quantum 
mechanical systems. Such explanations describe what we might naturally call non-
classical mechanisms. In this section we will briefly consider what such explanations 
look like, comparing classical and non-classical mechanistic explanations. 
In this paper we have identified three non-classical features of quantum mechanics: 
(A) indeterminacy of properties, (B) non-localizability of objects, and (C) non-
separability of states. Our conclusion to this point has been that decoherence explains 
why  we  don’t  typically  see  these  features in classical mechanistic systems. But now let 
us consider the sense in which we can offer mechanistic explanations when these 
features do pertain. Our view briefly is this: While the quantum mechanical 
indeterminateness of properties (A) is a serious problem for fundamental ontology, it is 
usually not a concern for scientific explanations. When it comes to potentially 
mechanistic explanations in the quantum realm, we are mostly dealing with systems that 
encompass a huge number of components, where only statistical statements matter. 
Thus the definite probabilistic predictions of quantum mechanics are all we need. Since 
we are not concerned with individual objects, the problem of indeterminate quantum 
properties becomes irrelevant.  
So how about the second threat for mechanistic reasoning, non-localizability (B)? 
We shall argue that localizability of parts, while important in many classical 
mechanistic explanations, is not an indispensable feature of mechanistic explanation.28 
The reason is that the fundamental mode of organization that matters in mechanisms is 
causal dependence, not spatial location. It is only when spatial location determines 
causal dependence that spatial location is essential to mechanistic explanation. In some 
mechanistic systems spatial location is absolutely essential. For instance, in the lawn 
mower discussed in section 2, the capacities of the various parts to interact with each 
other depend upon them being physically situated in exactly the right way. But in other 
thoroughly classical systems this is not the case. Consider for instance a system 
consisting of an ensemble of radio transmitters and receivers. Whether a particular 
receiver is connected to a particular transmitter will not depend upon its specific 
location, but upon whether it is tuned to receive the transmitted frequency. There are in 
fact many cases of classical systems where causal organization does not depend upon 
spatial organization. For instance, in biochemical mechanisms, organization is largely 
determined by the various molecular properties that make some molecules react with 
others, rather than on molecules having precise locations within a solution.  
                                                 
27 See Ball (2011) for a brief survey. 
28 Even apart from the potential problems with QM, Bechtel and Richardson (2010, part IV) as well 
as Kuhlmann (2011 and forthcoming b) argue that there are various cases where the decomposition of a 
system into localized parts with specific stable functions in the whole fails while there are still good 
reasons for maintaining that we are dealing with mechanistic explanations. This typically happens in 
complex systems. 
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If it is indeed causal rather than spatiotemporal organization that matters for 
mechanisms, we should be able to offer a non-classical but mechanistic explanation of 
certain kinds of quantum phenomena. We briefly consider here one such example by 
showing the sense in which the quantum-mechanical explanation of laser light is 
mechanistic.29 A laser produces light with a very high monochromaticity and intensity, 
provided the energy supply exceeds a certain threshold. The quantum theory of laser 
radiation starts on the most basic level of quantum field theory, where all the relevant 
parts of the laser mechanism are described in detail, e.g. atoms with internal structure 
and specific behaviors in isolation and interaction. The most important quantum 
mechanical aspect of laser light is the occurrence of stimulated emission of radiation. 
Laser theory explains this observable macro-phenomenon in terms of the interacting 
subunits, which in this case are the laser active atoms and the resulting electromagnetic 
field modes inside the laser. However, the field modes are not spatiotemporally but 
functionally characterized. But that is enough for a mechanistic explanation to work. 
The decomposition of a compound system into components is a pragmatic matter that is 
ultimately justified by its explanatory success. And in the exemplary case of the laser, 
understanding field modes as parts does the trick: The field modes interact with the laser 
active atoms in such a way as to produce the phenomenon of laser light provided certain 
conditions in the set-up are fulfilled, namely in particular the transgression of the laser 
threshold for the inserted energy. 
One remarkable result of the development of laser theory is how much of the 
(semi-) classical reasoning30 carries over to the quantum treatment. Since this continuity 
refers in particular to the essential interactive processes that produce laser light, this 
indicates that to the extent that (semi-) classical laser theory is mechanistic, so is 
quantum laser theory. Remarkably, treating not only the laser-active atoms but also the 
radiation field quantum mechanically doesn’t   seem   to   infect   the   explanation   of   laser  
light in its mechanistic nature. One may object that due to the essential role of extended 
fields,   i.e.   “objects”   that   are   not   localized,   (semi-)   classical   laser   theory   itself   isn’t  
mechanistic and thus neither is quantum laser theory. However, this is the same 
situation as in our above consideration of an ensemble of radio transmitters and 
receivers, and there we have already pointed out why a mechanistic reading pertains. 
In some cases, however, non-separability and the resulting quantum holism (C) 
may present an insuperable boundary to mechanistic explanation, because even the 
complete specification of parts and their spatio-temporal organization does not 
determine  all  properties  of  the  composite  system.  Hence,  mechanistic  reasoning  doesn’t 
always seem to work. 
Now one may argue that the specification of how the parts are organized in the 
whole must not only encompass external spatio-temporal but also internal relations, 
which  refer  to  the  entanglement  correlations  between  the  system’s parts.31 However, we 
think that this move would be against the spirit of the mechanistic approach because 
entanglement relations are inherently global. For similar reasons Darby 2012 argues that 
enriching the supervenience basis by entanglement relations leads away from David 
                                                 
29 For the full story see Kuhlmann (forthcoming a). 
30 In “semi-classical” laser theory only the atoms are described by quantum mechanics while the 
field in the laser cavity is treated as a classical electrical field. 
31 See Teller’s (1986) proposal of  “relational  holism”  and  the  discussion  in  Schaffer  (2010, 50-57). 
20 
 
Lewis’  metaphysical  thesis  of  “Humean  supervenience”,  i.e.  the  idea  that  the  world  is  a  
mosaic of local particular facts.32 But do these considerations by the same token 
undermine mechanistic explanations for genuinely quantum mechanical phenomena? – 
We think they do not. 
What   if   those  properties  of   the  composite  quantum  system  that  aren’t  determined  
by a complete specification of its parts and their external relations, are simply not the 
ones we need in our explanation? It is not the case that nothing is determined by the 
parts and their external relations. And in fact, in many scientific contexts we only need 
to know those properties that are determined by the parts and their external relations: 
They alone determine exactly what is crucial for mechanisms, namely the dynamics of 
the compound system.33 The reason is that the dynamics of a quantum-mechanical 
compound system is determined by its total energy, represented by the so-called 
Hamiltonian, which is neatly split up into parts that comprise the behavior of the 
system’s  components  in  isolation,  the  interactions  between  these  components  (described  
by interaction terms), and with any other relevant systems. In our quantum-mechanical 
laser, for instance, the Hamiltonian for the atoms inside the laser sums over the 
Hamiltonians of all the single atoms, i.e. each atom has its own Hamiltonian – 
notwithstanding the indistinguishability of   “identical   quantum   particles.”   The  
electromagnetic field modes, i.e. oscillations with different wavelengths, are also treated 
as independent parts, which interact with the laser active atoms. Now, the crucial point 
is that the dynamics of the compound system is determined by the total Hamiltonian, 
which is given by simply adding up the Hamiltonians for the subunits.34 There are no 
tensor products for Hamiltonians, and thus, neither is there an entanglement of 
Hamiltonians.35 While we make this argument for lasers, the same argument will apply 
to many other systems. Even in those systems for which quantum entanglements are 
locally detectable  and not irreversibly spread out into the environment by decoherence, 
mechanistic explanations (and mechanistic ontology) will still work so long as the 
specific entanglement correlations are irrelevant to the behavior of the system we want 
to explain. Hence threat (C) plays no role. Only if entanglement correlations are 
relevant for the dynamics are mechanistic explanations no longer possible.36 
                                                 
32 As Maudlin (1998, 60) nicely puts  it,  “[t]he  world  is  not  just  a  set  of  separately  existing  localized  
objects, externally related only by space and time. Something deeper, and more mysterious, knits together 
the  fabric  of  the  world.” 
33 Note that this essential fact is important not only for the explanatory aspect of mechanisms but 
also for its ontological one.  
34 Hüttemann (2005) discusses in detail what this point implies for the issue of emergence in 
entangled systems. 
35 Using the total energy one can derive differential equations for how the various parts of the laser 
will evolve in time.  This leads to a huge system of equations, which in addition are coupled with each 
other. One crucial starting point for solving this almost intractable system of equations is the empirical 
observation that there is a hierarchy of time scales: The slowly varying quantities, namely the field 
modes, can be treated as constant (in time) in comparison to the other quantities that change much faster. 
Eventually, one particular field mode wins the competition and dominates the beat, so to say. As a 
consequence, only one dominant mode of the light field emerges, giving rise to laser light. 
36 We think that this is the case for the dynamics of so-called   “EPR experiments”,   e.g.   for  
measurements of spin-correlated pairs of electrons. What happens in these experiments cannot be 
explained   mechanistically.   However,   this   doesn’t   seem   to   be   much   of   a   limitation   for   the   EPR 
experiments may not be sufficiently explainable at all as of now. Dorato and Felline (2011) explore 
whether   there   may   be   at   least   “structural explanations”   of non-local quantum correlations, beyond a 
commitment to ontic structural realism. 
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In conclusion, we think it is appropriate to say that the behavior of a composite 
quantum system is, under circumstances like those of the laser, due to what we call a 
“non-classical mechanism”:  The mechanistic explanation shows how a stable behavior 
of a compound system reliably arises purely on the basis of the interaction of its 
constituents, where it is the causal organization that matters and the spatiotemporal 
organization remains almost completely unspecified. One important difference between 
this case and our case of the classical set of transmitters and receivers is that in the 
classical case, it is possible to attribute locations to the parts while in the non-classical 
case it is not. But whether classical or non-classical, spatial organization is in both cases 
irrelevant to the mechanistic explanation. 
While we believe that the laser example shows how mechanistic explanation 
extends into the quantum domain, we do not mean thereby to suggest that all 
explanation in the quantum domain is mechanistic.  We have emphasized that in 
circumstances in which entanglement plays an essential role in the explanation of some 
phenomenon, mechanistic explanation is not possible.  Moreover, we believe that there 
are many high-standard explanations (both classical and non-classical) that are not 
mechanistic.  For instance, many explanations ignore mechanistic causal processes and 
appeal to abstract features of systems, e.g., by appeal to conservation laws, symmetry 
considerations and dimensional analysis.37 Explanations  of  “non-classical mechanisms”  
deserve to be called mechanistic because they share a lot with classical mechanistic 
explanations, and are quite different from these non-mechanistic explanations, whether 
classical or non-classical. 
6 Conclusion 
Let us take stock of what we have learned.  We have argued that even though 
decoherence   doesn’t   solve   the   global   conceptual   problems   of   quantum   mechanics   it  
helps considerably in abrogating worries that local mechanistic explanations may be 
undermined by the universal validity of quantum physics. Mechanistic explanations are 
concerned with the local causes of local phenomena that occur within the world.  For 
instance, why do flocks of birds so often form the inverted-1-shaped form often seen in 
autumn?  A mechanistic explanation explains how this local phenomenon arises through 
the local interaction of the birds; global entanglements between the birds (and their 
constituents) and the rest of the universe are (to a high approximation) not causally or 
explanatorily relevant to the production of this phenomenon.   
A central tenet of the mechanistic approach to causation and explanation is that 
mechanisms are particulars, and this entails that they are local in the sense we have 
described.  The phenomenon that a mechanism produces is a local phenomenon, and the 
parts and their interactions that produce the phenomenon are local as well.  If the 
explanandum concerns the local behavior of a system that behaves classically, and if 
there is an explanation of that behavior that refers to entities and activities that 
themselves behave classically, this explanation is not undermined by locally 
                                                 
37 There is a recent discussion about the explanation of universal macro behavior, e.g. identical 
phase transition behavior in gases and liquids, in terms of renormalization group methods. Batterman 
(2000) and Reutlinger (forthcoming) argue that this is best construed as a non-causal and a fortiori non- 
mechanistic type of explanation. 
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undetectable global entanglements of these entities and their interactions.  Moreover, 
the sorts of systems that are most clearly amenable to mechanistic explanation (e.g., 
biological systems) are open systems (i.e., systems that interact with their environment), 
and are thus systems for which the decoherence approach can be legitimately invoked. 
Beyond this, we have argued that even within domains where the behavior of 
systems must be explained by appeal to non-classical components, some explanations 
are still mechanistic.  At its core, the mechanistic approach involves explaining the 
behaviors of systems in terms of the properties of their parts. Such explanatory 
strategies are sometimes available even within the domain of quantum mechanics. 
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